

Message Text

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 12792 01 OF 03 081223Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 /083 W

----- 129234

R 081201Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1989

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY OSLO

AMEMBASSY OTTAWA

AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

USMISSION EC BRUSSELS

USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

USMISSION USBERLIN

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12792 01 OF 03 081223Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 03 BONN 12792

E.O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: CSCE, GW

SUBJECT: BONN AFTER THE HELSINKI SUMMIT

BEGIN SUMMARY: OFFICIAL SOURCES IN BONN ASSESS THE HELSINKI SUMMIT IN POSITIVE TERMS, CITING IN PARTICULAR THE SUPPORT WHICH THE FRG RECEIVED FROM ITS ALLIES ON THE GERMAN AND BERLIN QUESTIONS. AN ADDITIONAL IMPORTANT PAYOFF FROM THE SUMMIT WAS THE OPPORTUNITY FOR EXTENSIVE BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH BOTH WESTERN AND EASTERN LEADERS. ALTHOUGH THE SUMMIT IS NOW HISTORY, CSCE HAS NOT YET DROPPED FROM SIGHT IN BONN. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER APPEARED ON TV TO TELL THE VIEWERS NOT TO EXPECT TOO MUCH OF HELSINKI SO AS NOT TO BE DISAPPOINTED LATER. GENSCHER'S LOW KEY APPROACH WAS MUCH IN KEEPING WITH HIS OWN PERSONAL FEELINGS ABOUT OSTPOLITIK IN GENERAL AND CSCE IN PARTICULAR. ANOTHER INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT THIS WEEK WAS THE SIGN OF A SHIFT IN THE CDU/CSU OPPOSITION'S THUS FAR TOTALLY NEGATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE CONFERENCE. ONE CDU DEPUTY EVEN WENT SO FAR AS TO URGE THE CHANCELLOR AND GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BASKET III RESULTS, PARTICULARLY WITH THE EAST GERMANS. THE FOREIGN OFFICE WILL CONTINUE ITS CSCE OFFICE AND PLANS TO MAKE A SPECIAL EFFORT TO MAINTAIN EC-9 COHESION AGAINST EXPECTED SOVIET SALAMI TACTICS IN THE UPCOMING IMPLEMENTATION PHASE. END SUMMARY

1. WITH THE AUGUST VACATION PERIOD NOW A REALITY FOLLOWING THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, LIFE IN BONN HAS SLACKENED PERCEPTIBLY AS OFFICIALS DESERT THE HEAT OF THE CAPITAL FOR THE HEAT OF THE COUNTRYSIDE. CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER ARE NEVERTHELESS PRESENTLY ENJOYING THEIR VACATIONS IN THE NORTH AND SOUTH OF GERMANY RESPECTIVELY. HOWEVER, WHILE THE SUMMIT IS NOW HISTORY AND THE NEWS HEADLINES

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 12792 01 OF 03 081223Z

REFLECT OTHER PROBLEMS, CSCE HAS NOT FADED ENTIRELY FROM THE POLITICAL SCENE.

2. THE SKEPTICAL TO MODERATELY HOPEFUL REACTION OF THE GERMAN PRESS TO THE HELSINKI SUMMIT (BONN 12603 NOTAL) HAS BEEN REPORTED PREVIOUSLY. THE REACTION OF FONOFF OFFICIALS TOO IS RESTRAINED IN TONE. NEVERTHELESS, THE FRG IS PLEASED WITH THE

SUPPORT WHICH IT RECEIVED FROM ITS ALLIES IN HELSINKI ON THE BERLIN ISSUE. IN PARTICULAR, THE GERMANS APPRECIATED THE LINES WHICH PRESIDENT FORD DEVOTED IN HIS SPEECH TO BERLIN, WITH THAT CITY SINGLED OUT AS THE TOUCHSTONE OF DETENTE. IN THE BONN GROUP, THE FRG REP ON AUGUST 4 FORMALLY EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE ASSISTANCE OF THE US, THE UK, AND FRANCE IN WORKING OUT THE COORDINATED REFERENCES TO BERLIN IN THE SUMMIT SPEECHES. SUCH VITAL GERMAN INTERESTS AS THE PEACEFUL CHANGE OF BORDERS -- PRESERVING BOTH THE GERMAN AND EUROPEAN OPTIONS -- WERE SAFEGUARDED AS MUCH AS COULD BE EXPECTED.

3. BESIDES EMERGING RELATIVELY UNSCATHED FROM WHAT COULD HAVE BEEN AN UNCOMFORTABLE POSITION, THE GERMANS ALSO TOOK ADVANTAGE OF THEIR STAY IN HELSINKI TO MAKE NUMEROUS BILATERAL CONTACTS WITH BOTH EASTERN AND WESTERN LEADERS, (REPORTED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 12792 02 OF 03 081235Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 /083 W

----- 129395

R 081201Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1990

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE
AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12792 02 OF 03 081235Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 02 OF 03 BONN 12792

SEPTELS), THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH LED TO AN FRG-POLISH PACKAGE AGREEMENT ON EMIGRATION AND PENSION PAYMENTS (BONN 12722 NOTAL). IF THE FRG LEADERSHIP HAD HAD ANY EXPECTATIONS THAT CSCE REALLY REPRESENTED A TURNING POINT IN EAST-WEST HISTORY (WHICH WE DOUBT), THOSE WOULD HAVE BEEN QUICKLY DOUSED BY SCHMIDT'S BILATERAL TALKS WITH BREZHNEV AND HONECKER. AS REPORTED SEPTELS, THERE WAS NO SIGN OF GIVE IN THE SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN POSITIONS ON BILATERAL RELATIONS OR ON THE THORNY ISSUE OF INCLUDING BERLIN IN VARIOUS PENDING BILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS. NONETHELESS, THE FRG PERCEIVES THE HELSINKI SUMMIT, ON BALANCE, AS A POSITIVE EVENT.

4. FOREIGN MINISTER GENSCHER REMAINED IN THE CAPITAL LONG ENOUGH LAST SATURDAY TO VIDEO TAPE A 45-MINUTE DISCUSSION PROGRAM WITH GERMAN JOURNALISTS DEVOTED ENTIRELY TO THE CONFERENCE. THE SHOW WAS BROADCAST ON AUGUST 4 DURING PRIME EVENING VIEWING TIME. THE FOREIGN MINISTER GAVE A VERY LOW KEY PERFORMANCE, SO LOW IN FACT IT WAS ALMOST OFF THE KEYBOARD. HIS ANSWERS WERE BASED ON THE SPEECH WHICH HE DELIVERED

FOR THE GOVERNMENT IN THE JULY 25 BUNDESTAG CSCE DEBATE. GENSCHER REITERATED SUCH POINTS AS THE FACT THAT THE CONFERENCE HAD NOT DAMAGED VITAL GERMAN INTERESTS, THAT BERLIN WAS INCLUDED IN THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE, AND THAT FUTURE GERMAN AND/OR EUROPEAN BORDER CHANGES COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY PEACEFUL MEANS. HOWEVER, THE GENERAL THRUST OF HIS REMARKS WAS THAT THE WEST SHOULD NOT EXPECT TOO MUCH OF HELSINKI SO AS NOT TO BE DISAPPOINTED BY ITS TANGIBLE RESULTS.

5. GENSCHER'S LOW KEY PERFORMANCE WAS IN KEEPING WITH HIS OWN PERSONAL FEELINGS ABOUT CSCE. AS THE FORMER INTERIOR MINISTER DURING THE HEYDAY OF THE BRANDT-SCHEEL OSTPOLITIK, GENSCHER WAS AND STILL IS BASICALLY CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 12792 02 OF 03 081235Z

SKEPTICAL ABOUT THE ACTUAL BENEFITS TO BE REALIZED FROM SUCH A POLICY. GENSCHER WOULD PROBABLY HAVE PREFERRED NOT TO HAVE BEEN DRIVEN TO PORTRAY THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE SO POSITIVELY IN THE JULY 25 BUNDESTAG DEBATE. HOWEVER, AS IN THE LAWS OF PHYSICS, HIS POSITION WAS EQUAL TO AND OPPOSITE THE STRONG NEGATIVE STANCE TAKEN BY THE CDU/CSU. HAD THE CDU/CSU NOT STAKED OUT SUCH AN EXTREME POSITION, THE FOREIGN MINISTER WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO PRESENT A MORE MODEST BALANCE SHEET OF CONFERENCE RESULTS TO THE BUNDESTAG, MORE IN KEEPING WITH HIS TV PERFORMANCE AND PERSONAL PREDILECTION.

6. A MOST INTERESTING DEVELOPMENT THIS WEEK WAS THE EFFORT BY THE OPPOSITION TO TRIM ITS SAILS ABOUT THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE. A MEETING OF THE CDU PARTY PRAESIDIUM ON AUGUST 4 RESULTED IN THE ADOPTION OF A MODERATE LINE MORE IN CONSONANCE WITH THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION. THE CLEAR STATEMENTS IN HELSINKI BY PRESIDENT FORD AND OTHER WESTERN ALLIES REGARDING GERMANY AND BERLIN PROBABLY CONTRIBUTED SIGNIFICANTLY TO THE CDU SHIFT. A PRINCIPAL POINT MADE BY THE PRAESIDIUM AT THE AUGUST 4 MEETING WAS THAT, SOVIET AND EAST GERMAN COMMENTS AT HELSINKI NOTWITHSTANDING, THE GERMAN QUESTION REMAINS OPEN. IT IS PROBABLY TOO EARLY TO TELL WHAT THE CDU/CSU'S PUTATIVE SHIFT MEANS IN DOMESTIC POLITICAL TERMS. IN A PRIVATE CONVERSATION WITH THE AMBASSADOR ON AUG. 7, CDU CHANCELLOR CANDIDATE HELMUT KOHL EXHIBITED A VERY BEARISH ATTITUDE ON THE RESULTS OF THE CONFERENCE. WE ANTICIPATE THE OPPOSITION WILL CAREFULLY MONITOR THE IMPLEMENTATION (OR NON-IMPLEMENTATION) OF THE FINAL ACT IN ITS SEARCH FOR 1976 ELECTION ISSUES.

7. ON AUGUST 6, THE CHAIRMAN OF THE BUNDESTAG INNER-

GERMAN AFFAIRS COMMITTEE, CDU DEPUTY VON WRANGEL, CALLED
ON CHANCELLOR SCHMIDT AND THE GOVERNMENT TO ADOPT A
POSITIVE PROGRAM FOR IMPLEMENTING THE BASKET III RESO-
LUTIONS. VON WRANGEL BELIEVES THAT SPECIFIC AGREEMENTS
COULD BE NEGOTIATED WITH THE EAST GERMANS TO ELIMINATE
THE WORST INHUMANITIES IN FRG-GDR RELATIONS SUCH AS THE
BORDER DEATH STRIP. VON WRANGEL ADVOCATES TURNING THE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 04 BONN 12792 02 OF 03 081235Z

"DANGEROUS RESULTS" OF CSCE TO THE FRG'S ADVANTAGE BY
TAKING THE OFFENSIVE IN INTERPRETING THE FINAL ACT.

8. NEWSPAPER REPORTS INDICATED FURTHER THAT CDU FOREIGN
POLICY PARTY SPOKESMAN WALTER LEISLER KIEP WAS REFUSED

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 01 BONN 12792 03 OF 03 081237Z

43

ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02 INR-07 IO-10 L-03

NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05

ACDA-05 /083 W

----- 129439

R 081201Z AUG 75

FM AMEMBASSY BONN

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 1991

INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON

AMEMBASSY PARIS

AMEMBASSY ROME

AMEMBASSY ANKARA

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS

AMEMBASSY THE HAGUE

AMEMBASSY COPENHAGEN
AMEMBASSY DUBLIN
AMEMBASSY OSLO
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA
AMEMBASSY REYKJAVIK
AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG
USMISSION NATO BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY LISBON
USMISSION EC BRUSSELS
USDEL MBFR VIENNA
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY BERLIN
USMISSION USBERLIN
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY MADRID
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 02 BONN 12792 03 OF 03 081237Z

C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 03 OF 03 BONN 12792

AN OPPORTUNITY TO ADDRESS THE
BUNDESTAG ON JULY 25 BECAUSE HIS LESS NEGATIVE
EVALUATION OF THE CONFERENCE RESULTS DID NOT MESH
WITH THE HARD PARTY LINE ESPOUSED IN PARTICULAR
BY FRANZ JOSEF STRAUSS. KIEP HAS BRANDED SUCH
REPORTS "ABSURD," EXPLAINING THAT THERE WAS NOT
ENOUGH TIME TO DELIVER THE SPEECH. THE CONTROVERSY
OVER KIEP'S MAVERICK POSITION CONTINUES TO
SIMMER, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD APPEAR THAT THE PRAESIDIUM
HAS MOVED IN KIEP'S DIRECTION.

9. FONOFF EXPERTS ARE STILL WORKING ON THEIR OWN
EVALUATION OF CSCE, AND THEY ARE CONTRIBUTING TO A
BOOKLET SHORTLY TO BE PUBLISHED BY THE FEDERAL PRESS
AND INFORMATION OFFICE THAT WILL ATTEMPT TO PORTRAY
CSCE IN AN OBJECTIVE LIGHT. MEANWHILE, IT HAS ALREADY
BECOME APPARENT TO THE GERMANS THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF
THE AGREEMENTS SIGNED IN HELSINKI WILL BE FAR FROM
TROUBLE-FREE. THE FRG EMBASSY IN MOSCOW HAS REPORTED
THAT JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE ALREADY ATTEMPTED TO
OBTAIN MULTIPLE-ENTRY VISAS HAVE BEEN TOLD THAT
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS WOULD BE REQUIRED BEFORE SUCH
VISAS COULD BE ISSUED. A SENIOR FONOFF OFFICIAL

COMMENTS THAT, ALTHOUGH THERE IS NOTHING ABOUT
BILATERAL AGREEMENTS IN THE BASKET III PROVISION ON
JOURNALISTS, THE FONOFF WOULD HAVE NO OBJECTION TO
AN EXCHANGE OF NOTES WITH THE SOVIET UNION IF THE
PROBLEM COULD BE DISPOSED OF THAT SIMPLY.

10. WHILE CSCE IS NOW IN THE HISTORY BOOKS, THE FRG
DOES NOT PLAN TO DISMANTLE THE CSCE OFFICE IN
THE FOREIGN OFFICE. INSTEAD, THE OFFICE WILL CONTINUE
TO FUNCTION TO PICK UP SUMMIT AFTERMATH BITS AND
PIECES AS WELL AS ANY FOLLOW-ON WORK AS IT DEVELOPS.
THE GERMANS ARE PARTICULARLY INTERESTED IN MAINTAINING
THE COHESION OF THE EC-9 TO GUARD AGAINST POSSIBLE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PAGE 03 BONN 12792 03 OF 03 081237Z

SOVIET "SALAMI" TACTICS RESULTING FROM A DIFFERENTIATED
INTERPRETATION OF THE FINAL ACT VIS-A-VIS INDIVIDUAL
EC-9 COUNTRIES.
HILLENBRAND

CONFIDENTIAL

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SUMMIT MEETINGS, GOVERNMENT REACTIONS, INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENTS
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 08 AUG 1975
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: MartinML
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1975BONN12792
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: D750274-0579
From: BONN
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1975/newtext/t19750867/aaaacgtk.tel
Line Count: 408
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ACTION EUR
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 8
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: MartinML
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 07 APR 2003
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <07 APR 2003 by Izenbel0>; APPROVED <24 SEP 2003 by MartinML>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
06 JUL 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: BONN AFTER THE HELSINKI SUMMIT BEGIN SUMMARY: OFFICIAL SOURCES IN BONN ASSESS THE
TAGS: PFOR, GE, CSCE
To: STATE
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 06 JUL 2006